Mullah Nasruddin and the Geo-Politics of Iran

One of the most famous stories of Mullah Nasrudin is the story of the lost key. It goes something like this: A man is walking home late one night when he sees Nasrudin crawling on his hands and knees on the road, searching frantically for something on the ground. “Mullah Nasrudin,” that man says, “what have you lost?”. “I am searching for my key,” Nasrudin says. The man joins Mulla Nasrudin in the search and soon both men are down on their knees looking for the key. After some time, the man asks Nasrudin, “Tell me Mullah, do you remember where exactly you dropped the key?” Nasrudin waves his arm back toward the darkness and says, “Over there, in my house. I lost the key inside my house…” Frustrated, the man jumps up and shouts at Mullah Nasrudin, “Then why are you searching for the key out here rather than inside the house?” “Because there is more light here than inside my house,” Mullah Nasrudin answers.

The Key

The key to the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 is increasingly not the West’s resolve and the international community, but the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has the 8th largest military in the world (Statistica) and the largest missile force in the Middle East (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, p. 30). Statistica also used 50 variables to list militaries by “power” not just size.

Using 50 factors, Armstrong (2022) identified the top eight most powerful militaries as of January 2022 as:

1. United States
2. Russia
3. China
4. India
5. Japan
6. South Korea
7. France
8. United Kingdom

While Iran is 8th largest, it is not listed in the top ten of most powerful. Consider that, in 1990, Iraq was the 5th largest military in the world and briefly became the 4th largest (Roder & Jehl, 1990) before being routed on the battlefields of Operation Desert Storm. Russia is currently considered the second most powerful military but has been out maneuvered by the Ukrainian military for the last several months.

Iranian Geo-Politics

Iran is in a precarious geo-political position. Iran has recently joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which includes Russia as well. Iran shares a land border with three former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan) and a nautical border with another Soviet republic (Kazakhstan), but also with Russia itself. While Iran is benefiting from the war in Ukraine and Russia’s isolation, Iran is also uneasy with its aggressive neighbor. Consider this, Iran abstained from United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 and was curiously absent from the vote on United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/4. Iran’s vote against United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/3 in support of Russia was more about Iran’s human rights record and international standing than Russia.

Iranian geo-politics also includes its complicated relationship with its neighbor Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey are against an independent Kurdish nation-state, but Turkey is a member of NATO and Iran is an ascending member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Both Turkey and Iran are Muslim states, but Turkey is predominantly Sunni and Iran is Shi’a. Turkey has positive relations with Iran’s neighbor Azerbaijan, while Iran and Azerbaijan have had differing international agendas over the years. Azerbaijan is predominantly Shi’a like Iran, but Iran has more economic relations with its Christian neighbor, Armenia. Armenia imports Iranian natural gas as a mechanism to mitigate its energy reliance on Russia even though Russia and Armenia have generally positive relations. Turkey and Azerbaijan are exploring an energy pipeline to connect Azerbaijan with the European markets through Nakhichevan, while the Iranian government would like to ideally reach the European markets through Armenia to Georgia and then the Black Sea.

Russian Military Supplies

Yet, the Russo-Ukrainian War is quickly becoming a war not just of resolve, but of military supplies and production.

Russia has depleted the Iranian drones it purchased in August. For example, several times Russia launched 40 so-called “kamikaze” one-use-only Shahed drones per day. It has been reported that Russia purchased 2400 drones. For the sake of argument, let’s say that if Russia used the drones at the same rate as was used on October 17th, then the supply would last for 60 days. Russia began receiving the drone shipments on August 16, 2022, which was 63 days ago on October 18, 2022. Russia is already running out of both Iranian drones.

Russia is also running low on Russian-made missiles. Russia has been manufacturing 100–120 missiles per year for seven years and has likely produced approximately 840 Kalibr since 2015. It is known that Russia has used at least 48 Kalibr missiles in strikes on Syria with at least two other strikes with an unknown number of missiles on September 5, 2017, and February 3, 2018. Those missiles and possibly as many as 200 Kalibr missiles launched against Ukraine have drastically weakened the Russian reserves and Russia does not have the capacity to manufacture more at the same rate of expenditure.

According to Starchak (2022), there are two factories producing missiles for Russia: One factory produces 100–120 Kalibr per year and 12 Iskander missiles per year. Each Russian Kalibr cruise missile costs 6.5 million (Graff, 2022) and, according to Ukrainian Forbes, an Iskander missile costs $3 million per unit (Landa & Gnenny, 2022). A second plant also produces Iskander missiles and manufactures the Bulava submarine-launched missiles as well.

Iran’s Military Industrial Complex

Since 1992 Iran has also been “militarily sufficient” and has domestically produced guided missiles, tanks, APC, fighter planes (Associated Press, 2005). In 2021, it was confirmed that “Iran has a defense industry with the capacity to develop, produce, support, and sustain air, land, missile, and naval weapons programs” (CIA, 2022).

Iran’s military sales clients are a mixture of satellite states (Syria and Lebanon) and attempts to maintain and expand Iran’s sphere of influence in the Middle East (Iraq and Yemen) as well as Africa (Suda, Zimbabwe, and others). Iran has sold weapons not just to nation-states, but it has both sold and donated weapons to Shi’a militias in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq (Czulda, 2020).Czulda (2020) has identified “communication systems, short-range multiple rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles, and sniper rifles sold to Iraq” as well.

Not only has Iran sent air defense systems to Syria (Czulda, 2020), but it is believed that Iran has sent 3,000 military personnel to Syria as well (CIA, n.d). Light weapons and ammunition have also been supplied to other groups in Syria as well as Hezbollah of Lebanon. In addition, Kataib Hezbollah of Iraq has received motor vehicles and the Houthi in Yemen have received Iranian drones (Czulda, 2020).

And, ominously, at least as early as 2020, Russia made preliminary inquiries regarding Iranian drones (Czulta, 2020).

The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend

Prior to the advent of the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022, Turkey sold drones to Ukraine (and purchased Russian military systems as well). Iran is supplying drones and potentially missiles to Russia as both a way to gain hard currencies, but also to field test Iranian weapons and advertise its weapons industry to the world.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2020), the largest exporters were:

1. The United States
2. Russia
3. France
4. Germany
5. Spain
6. South Korea
7. Italy
8. China
9. Netherlands
10. The United Kingdom

Iran would like to increase its position as a weapons exporter outside of the Middle East and Africa. Sudan has purchased Armored Infantry Combat Vehicle, APCs, and drones from Iran, while Zimbabwe has used Iranian experts for helicopter repairs. Czulda (2020) also reports that at least nine other African states have acquired Iranian ammunition and other light weapons. It is believed that Ian has been supplying and selling other higher tech weapons air defense systems, the man-portable air-defense system, guided missiles, the Fajr missiles, unguided missiles, RPGs, and anti-tank guided missiles.

U.S.-Iranian Relations

American sanctions on Iran, the Iran Nuclear Deal, the social unrest in the wake of Mahsa Amini’s death, and the Russo-Ukrainian War are irrevocably interconnected. The Iranian nuclear program has always been not just about strategic nuclear weapons, but also a negotiating tool, as evidenced in the 2015 break-through agreement. While the Biden Administration is no longer actively engaged in reestablishing the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement (Ravid, 2022), that lack of engagement weakens the United States’ ability to influence Iranian weapons sales to Russia. An effective carrot-and-stick approach might be to continue engagement and, at the same, continued support of Iranian civil protests through the use of Starlink receivers (Vick, 2022) and other forms of technical assistance to the grassroots social unrest. Ukraine is gravely concerned about the Iranian missiles included in the second arms shipment to Russia (Hallam, Voitovych, & Atwood, 2022). The United States must interrupt the growing Russo-Iranian alliance to stop Putin’s war in Ukraine.

References

Armstrong, M. (2022). The world’s most powerful militaries. Statistia. January 14, 2022. https://www.statista.com/chart/20418/most-powerful-militaries/

CIA. (2022). Iran: Military equipment inventories and acquisitions. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/iran/#military-and-security

Czulda, R. (2020). What Iran might sell now that the UN arms embargo expired. Atlantic Council. October 21, 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/what-iran-might-sell-now-that-the-un-arms-embargo-expired/

Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019). Iran MIlitary Power: Core Iranian Military Capabilities: Ballistic Missiles. https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/Iran_Military_Power_LR.pdf

Graff, P. (2022). Explainer: Why Russia’s missiles on Ukraine have limited impact. Reuters. October 12, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-russias-missiles-ukraine-have-limited-impact-2022-10-11/

Hallam, J., Voitovych, O., & Atwood, K. (2022). Ukrainian Air Force says it has no effective defense against ballistic missiles Iran plans to ship to Russia. CNN. November 1, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-11-01-22#h_a3c9a4c6cbf1a7db4aa447563f868979

Hecht, E.(2022). Who has the biggest military? Breaking it down by active and reserve members. USA Today. August 27, 2022. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2022/08/27/who-has-biggest-military-world-most-powerful/7888866001/

Kennedy, N., Mahmoodi, N., Kottasová, I. Raine, A. (2022). CNN. Iran denies supplying Russia with weapons for use in Ukraine. October 15, 2022. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/15/europe/iran-denies-supplying-russia-weapons-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html

Landa, V., & Gnenny, K. (2022). Over the weekend, Russia launched missiles worth about $200 million over Ukraine. Forbes estimate. Forbes. June 26, 2022.

Ravid, B. (2022). U.S. “not going to waste time” on Iran deal right now, official says. Axios. October 31, 2022. https://www.axios.com/2022/10/31/iran-nuclear-deal-talks-biden

Starchak, M. (2022). Missed targets: the struggles of Russia’s missile industry. CEPA. June 27, 2022. https://cepa.org/article/missed-targets-the-struggles-of-russias-missile-industry/

Vick, K. (2022). Receivers for Elon Musk’s Starlink Internet Are Being Smuggled Into Iran. Time. October 22, 2022. https://time.com/6223999/starlink-iran-elon-musk/

World Bank. (2022.). Data: Iran, Islamic Republic. https://data.worldbank.org/country/iran-islamic-rep?view=chart