Putin’s Ploys:

The question is increasingly less “will he?” but “where will he strike?”

The West must prepare for what the world no one has seen since 1945: the intentional use of a nuclear weapon. The world has banned atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons for decades, but there have been the Three Mile Island Accident (1979), the Chernobyl Disaster (1986), and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster (2011). It appears we will now see the first intentional use of nuclear weapons in over 70 years. The question is increasingly not “will he?” but “where will he?”

Lowering the Bar

Consider that Dmitry Medvedev, the only living former President of the Russian Federation or of the U.S.S.R., has said:

“Let’s imagine that Russia is forced to use the most fearsome weapon against the Ukrainian regime which has committed a large-scale act of aggression that is dangerous for the very existence of our state… Let’s imagine that Russia is forced to use the most fearsome weapon against the Ukrainian regime which had committed a large-scale act of aggression that is dangerous for the very existence of our state… “I have to remind you again — for those deaf ears who hear only themselves. Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary… I believe that NATO would not directly interfere in the conflict even in this scenario. The demagogues across the ocean and in Europe are not going to die in a nuclear apocalypse…”

The Head (President) of the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, Ramzan Kadyrov, called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to use “low-yield nuclear weapons” (Carey, 2022).

Publicly criticizing or questioning Putin is not common in Russia, nor usually good for life expectancy. These two Putin allies are not criticizing Putin so much as they are lowering the bar for Putin. Their public comments make Putin seem more of a statesman if he does not use weapons of mass destruction, and the comments also makes the use of tactical nuclear weapons seem somehow less sinister. Earlier in 2022, Putin has said:

“The territorial integrity of our homeland, our independence and freedom will be ensured, I will emphasize this again, with all the means at our disposal. And those who try to blackmail us with nuclear weapons should know that the prevailing winds can turn in their direction” (Lister, 2022).

While Western observers may question who is blackmailing whom with nuclear weapons, the U.S. government thinks it is unlikely that Putin will order their use. Even after the annexation of Ukrainian territory gives Putin the argument that he is defending Russia, U.S. experts estimate that the risk is higher now, but still unlikely (Lillis & Bertrand, 2020).

From the perspective of Medvedev and Putin, Russia escapes culpability because their warnings were clear; “This is not a bluff” as Medvedev said (Shapiro, 2022).

To most observers, such dire warnings are a desperate gambit. American officials have said that they do not believe Putin would use tactical nuclear weapons though it is a possibility (Lillis & Bertrand, 2020).

Western Analysts are Wrong

The Western analysts are wrong. If not wrong, perhaps the analysts are being strategically dishonest. It is possible that Western governments are attempting to minimize public fears and manage the delivery of information. Sending sudden air convoys of anti-radiation medicine to Ukraine and neighboring counties might be interpreted as a panic move by Western media and as a green light by the Kremlin.

Yingst (2022) reports that the Ukraine intelligence services “believe there is a high probability Russia will use a tactical nuclear weapon.” Mellor (2022) has also reported on the Ukrainian intelligence warnings. According to some, the escalation has been associated with the threat with the recent faux annexation, but I argue that it is the Ukrainian liberation of Lyman that embarrassed Putin’s annexation ceremonies and raised the stakes. With the Russian loss of Lyman, Donetsk, just a day after Russia held ceremonies to annex the region (Nechyporenko & Mendonca, 2022) and the Ukrainian advances on Kherson as well Kwan, 2022), I believe Putin’s use of these tactical nuclear weapons is now more than a puncher’s bet. Yingst (2022) quotes Ukrainians that the nuclear weapon will be detonated in eastern Ukraine. The target will correspond with the size of the tactical nuclear weapon Putin deploys against Ukraine.

Regardless of what Ramzan Kadyrov called “low-yield nuclear weapons” (Carey, 2022) and the apparent distinction being accepted by Western media, there is no such thing as a “low-yield” nuclear weapon. In 2018, then U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said that from a strategic perspective, “I don’t think there is any such thing as a ‘tactical nuclear weapon’… there’s no difference at all. Any nuclear weapon used any time is a strategic game-changer (Lendon (2022).

Again, there is no such a thing as a “low yield” nuclear weapon, just “lower” yield weapons. By common definition, tactical nuclear weapons range from one kiloton to a yield of 100K (BBC, 2022). The American atomic bombs in WWII were 15–20K yield and killed a quarter of a million people instantly. Modern analysis by Alex Wellerstein estimates that a 15K nuclear bomb on Houston could kill 90,000; 100,000 in LA; 120,000 in DC; 151,000 in Chicago; and 264,000 in New York City (Bendix, 2022). Lviv has a pre-war population of 721,301 and has absorbed thousands of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), making it about the size of Denver, Colorado (711,483) and Seattle, Washington (733,919). With the internally displaced persons (IDPs), Lviv’s population may now be closer to the size of San Francisco, California (815,201); Lviv has an area of 57, slightly larger than San Francisco’s 47 square miles. Wellerstein’s simulations indicate that a 15K nuclear bomb on San Francisco would kill 64,ooo people instantly.

Will Putin Order the Unspeakable?

Often mentioned reasons for this risk analysis is that Putin cannot predict what the West would do in response as well as the risk that his orders might be countermanded or refused. Certainly, Putin is not intimidated by the West, militarily or economically. He is irritated, but not intimidated. He has hidden billions of dollars overseas (Harding, 2016). He is not afraid of the Russian public; he is an autocratic who has won four fraudulent elections (BBC, 2000; Mydans, 2004, Barry & Schwirtz, 2012; BBC, 2018).

He is afraid of one thing only, a palace coup (and perhaps his mortality).

Putin has already prepared his moral defense, knowing he will be demonized by history, he has tried to change the narrative to U.S. President Harry Truman and the United States by saying that the United States created nuclear “precedent” by bombing Japan (Reuters, 2022).

One of the assumptions in international relations are Rational Choice Theory and the related Rational Actor Theory. Analysts assume the state actors, such as Putin, act “rationally” even if others may not understand the actor’s sense of rationality.

Is Putin “insane”?

• After meeting with Putin in February, French President Emmanuel Macron said Putin was “stiffer and more isolated” than normal.
• In March, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Putin’s behavior as “erratic;” former Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director Robert Gates described Putin as “off the rails”; and Dr. Kenneth Dekleva who was a psychiatrist who worked at the American Embassy in Moscow said his behavioral analysis was that Putin is “frustrated” and “hurried” (Wolf, 2022).
• In April, Putin’s former associate, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, said that Putin was “insane” because Ukrainians did not welcome the invading Russian forces with flowers (Al-Arshani, 2022).

Is Putin dying?

• In the early spring, rumors swirled that Putin was being treated for a form of blood cancer. In June, Newsweek confirmed the treatments (Arkin, 2022) and also confirmed rumors of an assassination attempt in March (Arkin, 2022).

Is Putin out of touch? Too “controlled of an environment”? Afraid of a palace coup d’etat?

• There has been tension behind the scenes for years (Holodny, 2015), but Putin has managed to survive. He has eliminated most of his rivals, and therefore possible successors. During COVID-19, he isolated himself further. His smaller circle of confidants and the military, are afraid to be honest with him (Wilkie, 2022). A possible reason for Putin to not authorize tactical nuclear weapons may come from his fear it would “possibly spark opposition from the military or other key figures unwilling to escalate matters” (Hart, 2022).

Is Putin a “cornered animal” internationally?

• In addition to the remarkably cohesive sanctions packages, Putin has pushed Turkey back closer to its traditional NATO allies (Jackson, 2022) and alienated the People’s Republic of China (Ivanova, Yang, Sevastopulo, & White, 2022).

Is Putin a “cornered animal” domestically?

• While Putin does not inherently fear the general public of Russia, he can now count critics from all sides.
• His incarcerated opposition, Alexey Navalny, snuck a letter out of jail through his lawyers calling for a post-Putin Russia (Berlinger, 2022).
• Municipal leaders in Putin’s hometown, Nikita Yuferyev and Dmitry Palyuga have publicly accused Putin of treason (Ivanova, 2022).
• Right-wing ultra-nationalists want him to escalate and are already raising the ugly specter of anti-semitism as the fault for Russia’s losses (Kovalev, 2022).
• If Putin is removed from power alive, he almost certainly will face a trial at the ICC either in person or in absentia (Keefe, 2022).
• There are also unconfirmed reports of a second assassination attempt in September. (FP Staff, 2022), although there are serious questions regarding the reliability of these reports (Ibrahim, 2022).

Will He or Won’t He?

According to Western analysts, Putin apparently believes the threat of nuclear escalation (as well as the threats of economic and environmental terrorism such as the attack on Nord Stream [(Malloy & Vazquez, 2022)] will make the West force Ukraine to negotiate (Lister, 2022).

However, there is a limited public discussion in the West regarding the risk such weapons would have on Russia’s own territory and population. Even so-called ‘limited’ tactical nuclear weapons would be “catastrophic” (Tannenwald, 2022). Tactical nuclear weapons are only “low-yield” compared to modern “high-yield” strategic nuclear weapons (Lendon, 2022).

In the contamination level map of Ukraine at the Ukrainian National Chornobyl Museum, it is clear how devastating the radiation from the Chernobyl disaster was 77,000 square-miles in Europe (Čirjak, 2020). Čirjak (2020) points out that the radioactive iodine has a half-life of 30 years and is just now dissipating from the contamination zones. Drees (n.d.) quotes a 2006 study that identified 5,000 cases of cancer in Europe as a direct result of the Chernobyl Disaster and the same study predicts 41,000 cases by 2065.

Photo Credit: Anton Ivanov via Čirjak (2020)

Putin is considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. But due to the nature of the jet stream, which flows west to east, Putin must also consider environmental and political fall-out in Russia. The following two images show the destructive spread of radiation caused by the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986.

Photo Credit: Drees (n.d.)

Image from Møllera & Mousseaub (2006)

Where Will Putin Strike?

Political Map of Ukraine

Putin fears internal enemies in his government and is calculating how to appear strong at home, punish Ukrainians and their Western allies, without provoking a reciprocal nuclear response by the West. He will resort to a nuclear strike.

But, the city of Kharkiv is too close to the Russian border with Ukraine.

And, most of the land east of Zaporizhzhia is occupied by the Russian military.

While a significant strike on the city of Kramatorsk would blunt the Ukrainian offensive in the area and make a statement regarding the liberation of Lyman, Kramatorsk may also be too close to Russian forces and the Russian border.

If there is a nuclear strike in eastern Ukraine as suggested by Yingst (2022), the target will correspond to the size of the tactical nuclear weapon. The two most “logical” targets from the Russian perspective are Izyum and Lyman. Both cities are close to the Russian border, so the use of tactical nuclear weapons on either would be the smallest in the Russian arsenal, but either would send a strong political message. An attack on Izyum would destroy possible evidence of war crimes and an attack on either town would be a repudiation of Ukrainian gains.

Similar to Dr. Thornton, a security expert at King’s College London, I doubt the Russians will use a tactical nuclear weapon against major cities, such as Kyiv or Odesa. Kyiv, for example, is too close to the border of Putin’s ally President Aleksandr Lukashenko of Belarus. Similarly, a nuclear strike on Odesa [the Ukrainian preferred spelling] would affect Russian-occupied Crimea. Rod Thornton told Forbes magazine he thought the now famous Snake Island might be a possible target (Hart, 2022), but I disagree due to the jetstream patterns and the island’s location relative to Crimea (Snake Island is 100-miles due west of Olenivka, Crimea).

Dnipro and Kropyvnytskyi are large cities and further west from the borderlands with Russia and may be on the list of possible targets, but, in the mind of Vladimir Putin, there are two logical targets: Kryvyi Rih and Lviv.

Putin’s military has already shown an unusual interest in Kryvyi Rih, the hometown of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Al-Jazeera, 2022) and as the seventh largest city in Ukraine, it is neither the biggest nor the smallest. His government apologist, Dmitry Peskov, would inevitably spin it as sending a message but protecting larger costs to human life.

Leave Lviv

Putin would like to send a message to the West by detonating a 15–20K weapon near the city of Lviv. Not only was Lviv the “western” capital in the early stages of the war, but Lviv is the most western major city, and close to the Polish and Romanian borders. It is also possible that Putin will use conventional weapons to strike one of Ukraine’s nuclear reactors. That tactic would prevent Western intelligence from tracking the movement of tactical nuclear weapons and offer a small [but transparent] argument of deniability. A conventional strike on either the Rivne or Khmelnytskyi nuclear reactor facilities would have the same “benefits” of striking Lviv and less of the liabilities of striking the Yuzhnoukrainsk or Zaporizhzhia facilities.

Photo Credit: IAEA, Shayanne Gal, and Guenot (2022)

What if he does?

While Hart (2022) suggests Putin is wary of “possibly spark opposition from the military or other key figures unwilling to escalate matters,” McManus (2022) predicts the West will respond with conventional weapons to avoid an escalation of nuclear warfare, but legitimize sending more high-powered conventional weapons to Ukraine. Former CIA Director and retired four-star general David Petraeus said that the United States would respond “…by leading a NATO, a collective effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea” (Porter, 2022).

Whether ideologically motivated or opportunistic, there are Russian substate-actors who will seek to prevent that decimation of Russian military capabilities and the ensuing escalations.

In his classic 1969 article, Graham Allison discusses Model III: Bureaucratic Politics and wrote that “the leaders who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather, each is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government” (p.707). From Brutus to Claus von Stauffenberg, history is rife with examples of regimes brought down from within. And, while Putin has been in power since 1999 (Heilman, 2022), Omar al-Bashir ruled Sudan for over 30 years and was brought down by his own military when his military leaders concluded that he was a liability to their power because of the civil protests by Alaa Salah and the “Women in White” (Osman & Bearak, 2019; Sadek, 2019). Dissident Russians in the upper echelons of the Russian hierarchy, including the military and FSB, would be well advised to secure Putin’s daughters, Katerina Tikhonova and Maria Vorontsova as well.

Pre-Strike Intervention

The U.S. military believes that it would notice the movement of tactile nuclear weapons to the conflict zone (Lillis & Bertrand, 2020). Bender (2022) has reported that the United States has significantly ramped up its surveillance of Russian nuclear storage facilities, delivery systems, and communications. The intelligence teams and elite special military units must be tracking any movement of the Russian nuclear arsenal. Western allies must have disaster relief teams and supplies ready to respond.

Conclusion

Whether the successor(s) of Vladimir Putin will be a junta of technocrats, an illiberal strongman replacement such as Yevgeny Prigozhin, or a return to nascent democratic Russian potential led by Alexey Navalny (Berlinger, 2022), Putin must be removed. The question is now whether he will be removed before or after he orders a nuclear strike on Ukraine.

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